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In any era, widowhood has always been a disturbing prospect for a
woman. For English women of the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries it
torbode a nightmare. They had no social security, retirement funds or
substantial life insurance settlements to meet their financial requirements.
There was some provision at Common Law for the financial support of
widows but it was often times meagre comfort. Recognizing the failings of the
Common Law, husbands turned to the creation ofjointures in an attempt to
provide for their widows.
This paper examines the development of English jointures through three
phases. First, it analyzes the 1536 Statute of Uses, 27 Henry VIII C. 10, and
how it affected jointure formulation. Second, it appraises the impact of
important cases relating to the formulation of an effectivejointure. Finally, it
reviews three legal treatises of historical significance, re-evaluating in
particular the First Institute in which Sir Edward Coke asserted that his outline
laid the foundation for a "perfect" jointure.
Jointure Distinguished from Dower
Simply defined, ajointure was a "property provision for [the] wife, made
prior to marriage in lieu of dower." Henry Black, author of the standard law
dictionary, defined dower as "the provision which the law makes for a widow
out of the lands or tenements of her husband for her support." 2 While a
husband and wife could create ajointure only by contract, the Common Law
provided a widow with her dower as a matter of law. While it might appear
that dower was the preferable provision, there were weaknesses inherent in
the dower system.
Commencing during the mediaeval period, a widow suing for dower could
claim one-third of the lands her husband had owned during their marriage. A
tenant, for example, would be required to assign his tenancy interest in the
land to the widow when authorities determined that: 1) the decedent and
widow had been legally married, 2) he had been seised of the land in
question, and 3) he had died.'
The dower system proved to be an obstruction to the free alienation of title.
A husband could not freely divest himself of title during marriage for concern
that his widow might later claim a one-third interest in the property sold.
Second, if a husband held land in "use", he was not "seised" of that land
within the meaning of the law and the widow possessed no claim of dower to
such property. "Use" refers to the "right of one person [the husband] to take
the profits from land of which another had legal title [seisin].' 4 It did not
matter that a use survived for a prolonged period of time, perhaps even
longer than the life expectancy of the widow and the person seised of the
property. Finally, land held jointly escaped the claim of dower. William
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Henry Rowe, editor of Francis Bacon's The Reading Upon the Statute of Uses,
explains in his notes:
The dower at Common Law could not in those times be depended on;
because, although the husband might be in the enjoyment of large
estates and to all appearance the legal owner, yet it was possible, nay
probable, as uses were so general, that the legal estate on the lands was
in feoffees, and ...consequently his wife was not entitled to dower;
hence, prudence demanded, that a certain estate should be settled as a
provision for the wife.'
As an alternative, the future wife of a landed husband was frequently
offered and usually accepted ajoint tenancy orjointure, in lieu of dower. 6 By
this mechanism, a widow held specified lands for her own use and then, at her
death, passed interest in those lands to her eldest son. 7 This device had its
conceptual failings. Critics of jointure argued that the settlements created
conflicts of law. Courts of Equity, they observed, recognized jointures as a
bar to dower, as a means of obviating double satisfaction. 8 In contrast,
Courts of Law judged that the right of dower was a freehold estate which
could not be barred by collateral satisfaction. Thus, they concluded,
correctly, that a widow at law could claim her dower, as well as her jointure.
Since a Court sitting in Equity, and another sitting at law viewed jointure
differently, constant conflict was inevitable. 9
To avoid controversies of this kind, and to quiet the critics, husbands often
ensured that they held all title to land either jointly with their wives or in use
so that widows would have no reason to sue for dower. "' By opting for this
alternative, husbands made jointure a shield for the free alienation of land
not held in use. Moreover, fathers could better provide for the financial
futures of their daughters by negotiating generous jointure settlements.
The Statute of Uses
The Statute of Uses, enacted in 1536, dramatically changed property law
as it related to marriage settlements. The Statute contained five principal
points pertinent to jointure. First, the Statute proclaimed that anyone
holding land in use was thereafter possessed of a legal interest amounting to
an estate of which he was seised. " This was a remarkable change of vast
significance. Prior to the Statute, widows were not dowable of uses because a
use had been deemed to be less than a legal interest or an estate. The Statute
declared otherwise, and uses became legal interests in land, affording an
owner all the benefits provided by land ownership. Additionally, uses
became subject to all laws concerning land ownership, such as inheritance
laws and taxation laws. The Statute made it possible for a widow to take an
interest in uses (as she would other property formerly owned by her deceased
spouse) by means of dower. Had the Statute provided nothing further, the
judicial ramifications of this change, standing alone, would have been
catastrophic. Common Law Courts would have continued in their refusal to
recognize jointure as a bar to dower and widows would have leaped to claim
their new dower interests in uses, doubly enriching themselves beyond
anyone's intent. An important treatise on the laws concerning husband and
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wife, Baron and Feme, states, "If other provisions had not been made, the
Wives would have their Dowers as well as their jointures, and for this the
Branches concerning Jointures were added to the said statute." 12
Section Six of the Statute obviated legal chaos by specifically forbidding a
widow's dual claim of both jointure and dower. If she agreed tojointure, said
the Statute, she was barred from dower. If she accepted the jointure after
marriage, however, then upon her husband's death, she might later refuse
her jointure and demand her dower. 13 This exception was in tacit recognition
that wives generally suffered a disadvantageous bargaining position and that
husbands could coerce them into accepting a jointure not in their best
interests.
The Statute of Uses also provided that, if for any reason a woman was
legally evicted from any part of her jointure, she could claim comparable
lands of comparable value under dower. It also confirmed the validity of
testamentary dispositions of those persons deceased before I May 1536. In
effect, it guaranteed to women possession of any lands willed to them prior to
that date. 14 15
At first glance, the Statute of Uses limited the advantages of jointure as a
preference to dower. Common Law provided widows with a more substantial
portion of their husbands' estates than previously since dower, at law,
included uses.
What were the advantages ofjointure if widows could inherit uses? Alien-
ation of land under the dower system continued to be thwarted. Landowners
avoided that obstruction by employing jointure. Previously, women had
faced considerable expense and exhausting delay in pursuing legal pro-
ceedings to enforce an assignment of dower. With a jointure, however, a
woman entered her lands without the need for common law action. In
addition, "dower [was] forfeited by treason of the husband, yet lands held in
jointure remain[ed] unimpeached to the widow." ' 6 Finally, the Statutes of
uses recognized the validity ofjointure as a legally acceptable and convenient
tool for British landowners.
The First Five Cases
Significant judicial decisions followed the enactment of the Statute of
Uses, and clarified its meaning, revealing at the same time how inadequately
legal experts had defined the formula for a "good" jointure. 7
The Duchess of Somerset's Case (1554) Dyer 97b. clarified the meaning of
Section Six (prohibiting dual claims ofjointure and dower). Anne Seymour,
Duchess of Somerset, lost her dower rights when her husband was executed
in satisfaction of a felony conviction. Without jointure, Anne Seymour
would have been rendered destitute, a victim of intricacies of dower inherit-
ance. Fortunately for her, she and her husband had entered into an
agreement of jointure. Statute 1 Edward VI c. 12 had declared, however:
Everie Woman that is so or shall fortune to be Wife of the parsone so
attaynted convicted or outlawed shall be endowable and inhabyled to
demaunde have and enjoye her dower. I"
Anne Seymour sued for her dower in addition to her jointure for which she
had a valid claim under this statute. An issue was posed whether herjointure
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was formulated according to law (specifically, the Statute of Uses) and was,
therefore, a bar to dower. She claimed that was not a bar because herjointure
estate was limited "to her and her said husband in tail, and to the heirs, male
&c. which is none of the five estates which are first limited in the Statute." 19
Section Six of the Statute of Uses states:
Whereas divers persons have purchased or have estates made and
conveyed of and in divers lands, tenements and hereditaments unto
them and to their wives, and to the heirs of the husband, or to the
husband and to the wife, and to the heirs of their two bodies
begotten, or to the heirs of one of their bodies begotten, or to the
husband and wife for term of their lives; or for the term of the said
wife; or where any such estate . . . hath been or hereafter shall be
made to any husband and to his wife ...every woman married,
having such jointer ... shall not claim, nor have title to have any
dower. 20
The last phrase of Section Six, very general in its scope, appeared to be
applicable to almost any estate shared by a husband and wife.
The judges, sitting at law, decided that the wording of the Somerset
jointure fell within the prescription of the Statute of Uses and that Seymour
must be barred from dower. 21 While the decision illuminated the intent of
Section Six of the Statute, it left obscure the formula for effecting a "good"
jointure.
The absence of an effective formula lay at the base of Whorwoodv. LordLisle
(1547) Dyer 61b. Mrs. Whorwood sued for legacy and dower after her
husband, William, willed her one-third of all his lands in addition to her
jointure. She rejected her jointure and brought suit. The Court confirmed
her rejection ofjointure, in accordance with Section Nine of the Statute, but
debated whether she was entitled to the additional lands devised to her by the
will of her husband.
The difficulty of the issue centered on the definition of'"jointure" and the
wording of her husband's will. The experts argued that by devising to his
wife one-third of his lands "with" her jointure, William Whorwood had
incorporated that legacy into the jointure. When she rejected her jointure,
she rejected the legacy. 22
In a similar case, subsequently decided,23 Brooke J. disagreed. He held,
"Nor a devise of land by the husband to the wife by testament, is no barr to
dower, for this is a benevolence and not a jointure." 2" Unfortunately, this
lucid commentary followed the Whorwood Case. The judges of Whorwood took
an equitable approach and awarded Mrs. Whorwood her full legacy and part
of her dower. The value amounted to the original sum of her legacy and
jointure. " While the Court clarified Section Nine (the proviso which
allowed women to refuse jointures made after marriage and to sue for
dower), by noting when it was inapplicable, it refused again to define a
formula for effecting a "good" jointure.
With Villers v. Beamont (1556) Dyer, 146a., judges faced another puzzling
dilemma in which a document failed to create, unmistakably, a jointure.
Great Grandfather G. Beamont had sold certain lands to "R. C." for thirty
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years in exchange for £70. He retained the remainder with a life estate for his
wife, a life estate to the grandfather, and life estates to the father R. Beamont,
and Colet (the daughter of "R. C. "), the latter of whom were husband and
wife. Thereafter, the remainder was to pass to the heirs of R. Beamont and
Colet. Upon the death of R. Beamont, however, Colet remarried. She and
her new husband, Villers, alienated the land and "took back an estate in fee
to the second husband only." The heir of R. Beamont and Colet, N.
Beamont, entered the lands, an act justified by Statute 11 Henry VII c.20.26
This law stated:
If any Woman which hath had or hereafter shall have any estate in
Dower... with any others after taken husbond, discontynued aliened
releassed ... of the same ... that all such recov*eez (discontynuance)
.•. be utterly voide and of none effecte. And it shall be lefull to every
psone and psones.., to be recov*ed. 27
In other words, the statute made it lawful for a rightful heir to take possession
of property which had been ineffectually and illegally conveyed by a
dowager.
Villers brought suit against N. Beamont to reclaim the lands. N. Beamont
argued that the grant had been in consideration of £70 and the impending
marrriage between Colet and R. Beamont. He urged that the remainder was
meant for Colet's jointure. Justice Dyer noted, however, "that no word of
any marriage to be had between R. Beamont and Colet is expressed in the
indenture, nor any word of any jointure to Colet.'" Dyer maintained since
the contractors neglected to include such a premise to the transaction, one
could not aver such intention. In his argument, Dyer cited precedents in
which the Courts had rejected parol evidence.
From Dyer's analysis, one might conclude that the Court enteredjudgment
for Villers. Dyer himself never explicitly relates the result of the conflict.
Only in the last paragraph of his extensive analysis does Dyer admit:
But Stamforde, Browne and Brooke, argued to the contrary . . . the
entry of Beamont was lawful by the Statute 11 H. 7. for they expounded
that phrase" given by ancestors, &c." to be any manner of way assured
to the woman in jointure either for money (as fewe marriages be made
nowe-a-dayes without it) or else freely; and that the effect of that which
is found by the assignment of "as well in consideration of the said
marriage &c. as of the sum &c." is contained within the indenture, and
so their finding is no wise contrary thereto. 28
In this last paragraph, Dyer acquiesced to the will of the majority opinion
and the equity of the solution. Judgment was entered for N. Beamont.
Without the text of the original Beamont contract, the historian cannot
reasonably assess Dyer's analysis nor balance it against the opinion of the
other judges.
Another similar case whose judgment casts light on the Villers Case is
Ashton's Case (1564) Dyer 228a. Richard Ashton Sr. gave the use of certain
lands to his prospective daughter-in-law, Elizabeth Bavenport, for her life.
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In exchange, William Bavenport gave seven hundred marks along with his
daughter. Richard Ashton Jr. and Elizabeth Bavenport married. After
Richard Ashton Sr. and Richard AshtonJr. died, Elizabeth Ashton sued for
her dower in addition to the grant which she obtained from Richard Ashton
Sr.
The question before the Court was whether the grant was ajointure and a
bar to dower. Justice Dyer stated, 'She was not his wife at the time of the
feoffment made and ... the said feoffment was not made to the lands of the
husband, nor by the husband according to the Statute of 27 H. 8 (c. 10).
"The court decided, however, that Richard Ashton Sr. had made a good
jointure and barred Elizabeth from her dower. 29
As in the Villers Case, the majority felt that, while the grant was not given
for jointure expressly, one should reasonably interpret the gift to be in the
nature of a jointure. The Court first established the averment technique in
the Somerset Case. The Court found the wording of the Somerset jointure
'compatible with," if "not exactly like," the specified wording in Section
Six of the Statute of Uses. Thus, it mattered not for Elizabeth Ashton that a
party other than her husband had made the grant. Browne, Brooke, and
Stamforde noted in the Villers Case that Statute 11 Henry VII c. 20 recognized
a grant" given to the seid husbond and wif in taill or for t *me of lyfe by any of
the Auncestors of the seid husbond." 3" Since Richard Ashton Sr. was not
only an ancestor but was the father of the groom, it struck the court as
necessary logic that it determine the grant to be a jointure settlement.
Rationale evolved. With each case, the formula for a "good" jointure was
more precisely defined. Thus far, however, no court had reached beyond the
specific issues presented to it nor attempted to provide an all-encompassing
definition, or guide to the creation of an effective jointure. By 1566, Dyer had
accepted the averment process for an unexpressed jointure.
Dame Dennis' Case (1566) Dyer 247b. presented a different problem,
however. Sir Maurice Dennis granted that, after his marriage to Elizabeth
Statham, the two of them and their heirs would share certain lands. The
marriage occurred. Maurice died. Thereafter, Elizabeth entered upon the
lands and sued for her dower. She did not prevail. Dyer noted that the judges
accepted "an averment that the grant was for a jointure."
The issue in Dame Dennis's Case was whether a grant of lands in fee simple
would make a good jointure under the law. Catlyn, Dyer and Saunders
argued that the Statute of Uses "speaks of jointure 'for terms of life, or
otherwise'." This phrase, they determined, included all types of estates.
Browne and Whyddon disagreed. They drew again from 11 Henry VII c. 20
to show that a grant must be limited "for life or in tail, jointly or severally
with the husband." 3 The majority opinion of Catlyn, Dyer and Saunders
ruled in this case and required that Elizabeth accept the fee simple jointure
Maurice had granted her before their marriage.
In retrospect, the historian might feel the frustration felt by sixteenth-
century legal practitioners in their search forjointure guidelines. The courts
never presented the legal community with a package formula for a "good"
jointure. That was not (nor is it today) the role of Common Law Courts,
however. These courts apply or interpret, as necessary, legislative laws.
They adjudicate issues presented to the bench by contending parties. Under
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this English system, the Common Law "emerges" slowly. It unfolds and
evolves as new disputes or concerns come before the courts for resolution.
In the Whorwood, Somerset, Villers, Ashton, and Dennis cases, the Common
Law system functioned in exemplary form. Insular clarification spanning 25
years contributed to the evolution of jointure formulation. The Common
Law emerged as the society it served matured and developed. What remained
confused or undetermined about jointure formulation would find clarification
with the ripening of time.
Thirty-seven years after the passage of the Statute of Uses, Sir Edward
Coke3 2 assembled the consensus of the law pertaining to jointure, and
extended thought beyond consensus with his own incisive understanding of
English Common Law.
The Vernon Case
Sir Edward Coke's reflections on jointure appeared in his report on
Vernon's Case (1592) 4 Co.Rep. 1. Judge Dyer wrote a report on this case but
Coke's analysis went far beyond anything previously recited in case law on
jointure.
The facts of the Vernon case were simple enough. During his marriage,
John Vernon alienated certain land and took a use in it for himself, with a
remainder to his wife, Mary, for her life, then to his heirs. Mary Vernon
entered those lands after his death and simultaneously sued for her dower.
The case appeared to be a jointure by averment which is exactly what the
defendant and heir ofJohn Vernon pleaded. Mary complicated the situation,
however, by claiming that her husband placed a condition upon the grant.
Mary, he had said, was to act as executrix of her husband's will and perform
associated necessary tasks. She fulfilled her part of the bargain, she argued,
and in consideration therefore acquired the lands of the grant. She brought
suit for assignment of dower because the grant was not a proper jointure.
Her suit was not successful.
Coke remarked that the presiding judges resolved five points. First, Coke
explained that a right to inheritance or freehold could not be barred by
collateral satisfaction. He reasoned that a grant of land failed to bar dower
"because she [a wife] had no title of dower at the time of the acceptance of
satisfaction, but it accrued after." Coke noted, however, that the Statute of
Uses amended the Common Law so that jointures acted as a bar to dower.
Therefore, he said, the question to answer in the Vernon case was whether
the grant was a jointure, if not, Mary Vernon deserved her dower. "'
In examining whether Mary's grant was ajointure, Coke made his second
point. "If a man makes a feoffment to the use of himself for life, and after-
wards to the use of his wife for her life, for the jointure of his wife, that such
estate in remainder is within the intent of the said act 27 H.8." This issue
relates back to the Somerset case which Coke cited. Failure to grant ajointure
using the exact wording of the Statute of Uses did not automatically void the
document. Coke referenced the Ashton case, as well. He explained that, in the
Ashton case, the donors made the grant before there was a husband and wife.
Moreover, the grant was made to a woman alone. Despite these differences,
the Ashton grant fell within the intent of the Statute. Coke implied by
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comparison thatJohn Vernon intended, though not expressly, that his grant
be for Mary's jointure.
Coke emphasized, in making his second point, that the jointure had to be
good immediately after the death of the husband. He made an often quoted
analogy to clarify this requirement.
If the husband makes a feoffment in fee to the use of himself for life, and
afterwards to the use of B. for life, and afterwards to the use of his wife
for life, for her jointure, it is not within the act although B. dies, living
the husband. "
Coke suggested that B. might die after the husband in which case, B. might
prevent the wife from obtaining her jointure. Thus, even if B. were to die
before the husband, the jointure would be invalid from its inception because
of the contrary contingency.
Coke's third point resolved the problem of conditional jointures such as
Mary Vernon's. Coke argued that dower, for which jointure was a substitute,
was a life estate. A condition on a life estate did not alter the fact that it was
still a life estate. Therefore, if a woman accepted a jointure by fulfilling a
condition, the jointure fell within the intent of the Statute of Uses. Coke
stated:
Forasmuch as an estate for life upon condition, is an estate for life, it
was within the words and the intent of the act, if the wife after the death
of her husband accepts it; for it is agreed that a jointure is a competent
livelihood of freehold for the wife, to take effect immediately after the
death of the husband, for the life of the wife, if she herself is not the
cause of the determination of forfeiture of it. 36
In this passage, Coke not only decided the issue of the conditional jointure
but again defined jointure. Definition continued to be his primary concern
throughout his analysis of the Vernon case. The two required elements
mentioned here (that the jointure be good upon her husband's death and that
it be a life estate or greater) are the first two jointure requisites he acknow-
ledged in the Institutes.
Coke's fourth point centred on election and reiterated Section Nine of the
Statute of Uses. A woman who agreed to a jointure before marriage was
barred from dower. A woman who accepted a jointure during marriage,
however, might refuse her jointure and elect to have her dower. Coke cited
the Ashton case again as an example of the first clause in effect. He quickly
pointed out, though, that the Ashton grant constituted a complete jointure.
He explained that a woman might accept a grant before marriage for part of
her jointure and another grant after marriage for the remainder of her
jointure. Upon her husband's death, she could refuse that portion granted
after marriage and collect the ante-nuptial grant and her dower. Coke
remarked, "The words of the act are, for the jointure for the wives, and not
for part of their jointures." Coke did not cite a case for this postulation,
though he may have had one in mind.
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The last point Coke made pertains to the averment of jointure. Coke
refuted the idea that the grant was consideration for the performance of the
will. He maintained "it may be averred to be for the jointure of his wife, for
the one consideration stands well with the other." Coke suggested that, as
easily as Mary could claim one reason for the grant, he could argue another.
It was one reasonable conclusion against another. Coke referred to the
debate in the Villers case to substantiate his position. "
While this was the last point Coke discussed, he continued his analysis of
Vernon and other cases. These last comments were not as lucid as the first of
his evaluation, but he raised several important issues.
First, Coke discussed the problem of fee simple jointure. In the Dennis
case, Dyer reported that Judge Brooke rejected the concept of a fee simple
jointure. Browne and Whyddon also argued against it, stating that the form
was not acknowledged by 11 H.7. c.20. In the Vernon case, Dyer reaffirmed
his belief that a fee simple jointure was valid."3
Coke supported Dyer's stance by dismissing the relevance of 11 H. 7. Coke
stressed the I1 H.7. aimed at restricting alienation of only dower and other
fee tail grants-not necessarily jointures. Not once does the word "jointure"
even appear in the statute. Naturally, 11 H.7. failed to cover fee simple
inheritance, "for to restrain such estate that it shall not be aliened is repugnant
and against the rule of Com. law." Therefore, Coke insisted, since 11 H.7.
addressed a separate issue, 27 H.8. was the important statute to examine for
a ruling on fee simple jointure.
Coke re-introduced the phrase "for term of life, or otherwise injointure"
from the Statute of Uses. He claimed that "otherwise" referred to all other
estates conveyed to the wife. He asserted that otherwise "extends to all other
estates conveyed to the wife not mentioned before in the act, which are as, or
more, beneficial to the wife." Something more beneficial than a life estate
included a fee simple grant. 39
Another issue of concern to Coke which he addressed at the end of his
report was jointure by devise of land. Brooke argued that a devise of land was
no bar to dower because it was a benevolence. Coke agreed that, until
expressed differently, wills must be taken with the traditional intent. Second,
Coke said, "The whole will concerning lands by the Statutes of 32 and 34
H.8 ought to be in writing, and no averment ought to be taken out of the
will." In this postulation, Coke depended on the wording of the Statute of
Wills-to justify his position that one could not aver jointure from a devise. 40
Coke's analysis of Vernon's case ended with a discussion of the devise of
land. Oddly Coke failed to advise his readers what the majority ruled in the
Vernon case. From his discussion of the last four points, however, one may
presume that Mary Vernon was barred from her dower.
Dyer's comments support such a conclusion until his last passage which
reads:
But for the exception to the pleading above all against Dyer; and
Harper [a dissenting judge] pertinaciously adhered to his opinion as
above; and all in favor of Dower, and that the estate above cannot by
possibility be intended for jointure. 4
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Dyer thus suggested that all the otherjudges disagreed with him and allowed
an assignment of dower. Unfortunately, Dyer failed to identify "the
pleading above." Did "the pleading above" refer to the Vernon case? If so,
Coke may have been using the Vernon case to illustrate good law badly
applied.
Dyer's remarks, which precede the quotation cited above, relate to a
different case and offer some clarification.
Wherefore also Dyer thought that although the fee simple be appointed
over to the wife, or ajoint estate made to the husband and wife in fee, it
may, if it be not expressed in the conveyance by writing to the contrary,
be averred for jointure, contrary to the report of Brooke tit. Dower. 42
Dyer was clearly speaking of another case because Mary Vernon's grant was
a grant in fee tail. Dyer used this opportunity to take another intellectual cuff
at Brooke on the fee simple/fee tail debate. Since the passage refers to another
case, the phrase which followed might be a continuation of that argument.
The wording of Dyer's last passage fits, indeed, with the Brooke rebuttal
which it follows. "But for the exception to the pleading above, all against
Dyer" could mean that, on the Brooke case, all the judges opposed Dyer.
"Harper pertinaciously adhered tb his opinion as [explained] above [in the
Brooke case]." Finally, "the estate above cannot by possibility be intended
for ajointure" probably refers to the Brooke jointure. If Dyer had wanted to
decide the Vernon case, he would have spoken of the grant or gift not being
intended for ajointure. An estate was not the issue of debate in the Vernon case
as Dyer presented it. The jointure was conditional but nowhere did Dyer
refer to a conditional estate.
Secondary sources confirm that the court refused Mary Vernon her
dower. John Bryant explained, "The Court determined that she was barred
of her dower by acceptance of the provision [jointure] in lieu of it. " " Sidney
Bell confirmed, "It was held that acceptance did deprive the widow." 44 And
Edmond Atherley stated:
The Court resolved-that although the estate limited to the wife was
upon condition ... for as much as an estate for life upon condition, was
an estate for life, it was within the words and intent of the act IF THE
WIFE AFTER THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND ACCEPTED
IT.
45
The point Atherley raised is that Vernon's jointure barred dower because
she accepted the jointure. He suggested that it mattered not whether the
grant was within 27 Henry VIII c. 10 from its inception; she waived dower by
accepting it. The diffficulty with this, he explained, is that if jointure was
void before her acceptance, collateral satisfaction would not have barred
dower. "Therefore, there may be reason to think that a jointure, such as in
Vernon's case is nothing more than a MERE EQUITABLE ONE." 46
Evidence in Coke's analysis of Vernon's case indicates that Atherley was
correct. The reasoning in Coke's third "point" suffers when examined
again. Coke argued:
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If the condition binds her to any unreasonable thing she might have
waived it, but when she ... enters and accepts the conditional estate for
her jointure, she is barred of her dower.
Coke asserted that the widow's acceptance validated the jointure. He noted
earlier, though, that ajointure should be valid from its inception and that no
subsequent action would make it so. He started:
Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescet [that
which is bad in its commencement improves not by the lapse of time]
... Quae mala sunt inchoata in principio, vix est ut bono peragantur
exitu [things bad in principle at the commencement seldom achieve a
good end]. 48
Coke was not persuasive in his argument that a conditional jointure was
valid. If it was not valid, Mary Vernon should have received her dower.
In retrospect, the outcome of the Vernon case is of little consequence when
compared to the relevance of Coke's analysis. Whilst his argument on the
validity of conditional jointure may prove less than adequate, it does not
necessarily follow that conditional jointure failed the test of 27 Henry VIII
c. 10. In any case, his analysis in general profoundly affected the definition of
jointure and the establishment of a jointure formula. Coke's review of
Vernon's case provides the basis for his discussion of jointure in his Institutes,
the authoritative treatise on sixteenth and early seventeenth-century
jointures.
The Treatises
Coke's First Institute was not the first treatise written after his Vernon report.
An attorney "of the Duchy of Lancaster," Mr. John Brograve wrote an
article on jointures in 1576 which was published in 1648, entitled Three
Learned Readings Upon Three Usefull Statutes. Brograve organized his work into
ten chapters. In each chapter was an outline of five to 23 cases. In each case,
he summarized pertinent facts and determined whether jointure created was
valid. Each statement of facts is very specific.
Two statements of fact compare with cases already discussed in this paper.
In Chapter Four, case number 16 reads:
I. S. enfeoffeth I. D. to the Use of the husband and wife, and the heirs of
the husband, for &c. and before the Statute of 27 I. S. enfeoffeth the
husband and wife the statute is made, the husband dyeth, the wife
enters; thus is &c.
4 9
These facts resemble the Somerset case. At issue is the wording of the grant. As
in the Somerset case, the wording"... and the heir of the husband, for &c ......
met the Statute's requirements.
Brograve's case number 18 states:
I. S. covenanteth with I. D. in consideration of a marriage, to be
betwixt A. his son and B. that his Mannor of D. after his death shall
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remaine to A. his sonne and B. his wife, in Fee for &c. the Father and
A. die, the wife enters; thus is not &c. "
This example is like the Ashton case. In Ashton, however, the grant was a life
estate and not specifically a fee simple. Furthermore, the Court determined
that Ashton's grant was a good bar to dower.
What Brograve ignores in his collection of cases is a statement of facts like
those in the Vernon case. Perhaps something other than the Vernon case
prompted Brograve to write his article. The Vernon case was not considered a
"landmark" until Coke wrote his analysis of it after 1600. It is probably
nothing more than a coincidence that Brograve's guide succeeded the Vernon
case by four years and the Statute of Uses by forty.
Further discussion of Brograve examples is not pertinent to this paper.
Brograve wrote a guide, perhaps for attorneys who could compare their cases
ofjointure to the examples given. Brograve outlined circumstances in which
jointure would be valid but he did not define a jointure formula.
Coke published First Institute in 1628. He proposed to update Littleton's
work on the Common Law. In his preface, Coke wrote, "We have in these
Institutes endeavored to open the true sense of.every of his [Littleton's]
particular cases."' '- In a very organized fashion, Coke specified, in his
chapter on dower, six requisites "to the making of a perfect jointure within
the statute.' 
5 2
First, Coke explained, a woman's jointure must take effect immediately
after the decease of her husband. While this requirement was not one of
Coke's principal points in the Vernon case, he had stressed immediacy as
being vitally important. Secondly, said Coke, "It must be either in fee, tail or
for term of life." Again, this was not a primary focus in the Vernon case but
Coke decided the fee simple/fee tail debate in a lengthy discussion there.
Coke's third requisite introduces an issue not before discussed in this
paper. He argued that an estate or its profits must be conveyed to the wife
directly and not to another party in trust. " His fourth requisite came out of
his discussion of Vernon's case. Coke asserted that a jointure must be "in
satisfaction of her whole dower, and not part of her dower." Fifth, the
contract or grant had to express or aver that the jointure satisfied the dower
interest. To this, Coke added "a devise by will cannot be averred to be in
satisfaction of her dower unless it be so expressed in the will." Finally,
Coke's sixth requisite was a reiteration of the Statute. The jointure could be
made before or after marriage.
Coke's comments in the First Institute (with the exception of requisite
number three) were simply a polished outline of his jointure definition from
the Vernon case. Coke admitted, "I have touched these points the more
summarily, because they are resolved at large with reasons thereof in
Vernon's case. 54
In 1632, a work called The Woman's Lawyer expanded upon Brograve's
treatise. At least one editor has suggested that the author modelled this
writing on jointure after Brograve's guide. The editor concludes:
The collections gathered, as I thinke, by some well learned and
industrious student out of Mr. Brograve's reading, though they want
38 THE CAMBRIAN LAW REVIEW
of fulnesse and perfection which the owne pen of so great a lawyer
might have given them. "
Unfortunately, two prefaces reveal little else about the creation of The
Woman's Lawyer. "I. L." suggests that if the author is not dead, the work was
written a long time ago.56 "T. E." states:
By whom the following Discourse was composed, I certainly know not
... Those vitia Scriptoris, and authors, which I found I amended and
have added many reasons, opinions, cases, and resolutions of cases to
the author's store. 57
Since "T. E." placed all his comments in the original text and not in
footnotes, it is impossible to tell his additions from the original. For that
reason, it is impossible to follow the development ofjointure from Brograve's
treatise to Coke's Institutes. In its edited condition, The Woman's Lawyer post-
dates the Institutes in publication and cites the First Institute, as well as Vernon
and other cases. The Woman's Lawyer does not, however, discuss Coke's six
requisites nor does it address the problem of conditional jointures.
Stylistically, The Woman's Lawyer reads much more like Brograve's guide and
does not give a formula for effecting a good jointure. Coke's First Institute must
be considered, therefore, the most important legal treatise of its day relating
to jointure.
Coke's "Perfect" Formula Reviewed
This study of jointure development began with the legitimization of
jointures by the Statute of Uses in 1536. It ends with a formula for the
"perfect" jointure as stated by Coke in 1628. Following the fee simple/fee
tail debate and the devise of land controversy, one sees that the development
of the jointure formula was not a linear progression. The definition of
jointure grew barely clearer as judges struggled with the succession of cases
which followed the Statute. Sir Edward Coke's report on Vernon's case
demystified jointure formulation. He later polished his ideas and unveiled
his six element formula in the First Institute.
Two basic questions remain. The first is whether Coke's formula really
produced a "perfect" jointure. The second is whether the cases discussed in
this paper would have been decided in the same way if the presiding judges
had used Coke's formula.
An analysis of the cases next to Coke's formula shows that only two of the
cases might have been decided differently. The Whorwood case might have
been. Recall that Mr. Whorwood willed his wife one-third of all his lands
"with" herjointure. The Court decided that this devise was meant to be part
of the jointure provision, not a benevolence in addition to the jointure.
Coke's fifth requisite provided that a devise is not a jointure until expressed
as such. In 1547, when the Whorwood case was decided, that requisite had not
been clarified and the court opted for an equitable solution, contrary to
Coke's subsequent analysis.
If the case had been judged after 1628, the court might have decided that
"with" was not sufficiently specific to make the devise a jointure. Thus,
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Mrs. Whorwood might have been awarded her legacy and her dower. No
one can say for certain what a later court would have decided. This re-
examination of the Whorwood case, though, emphasizes that the development
of jointure formulation was not predictable or smooth.
The second case that calls for re-examination is the Vernon case. Why
return to the Vernon case when Coke drew his formula from that decision?
The Vernon jointure embodied something more than Coke's six requisites: it
contained a clause of conditionality. Coke argued that this condition did not
matter because Mary Vernon accepted it. As noted above in this paper, that
reasoning is flawed.
The Vernon decision was an equitable one. Mary Vernon agreed to her
jointure after she was married. She had a right, according to the Statute of
Uses, to reject her jointure. Coke said she would and should have done so if
the condition was unreasonable.
Query what Coke would have said if Mary had agreed to herjointure before
marriage, she could not later refuse it. Would Coke have argued that she
should have refused it before marriage if the condition was unreasonable,
and since she did not she was bound by her choice? No. Coke probably would
have realized that the condition of having to serve as executrix (a condition
precedent)" voided the jointure since Mary would not enjoy her settlement
immediately after her husband's death. He would have noted, therefore,
that acceptance of a void document does not make it legal.
The fact that Mary agreed to her jointure after marriage and had the
option of suing for dower lulled Coke into regarding the condition as insig-
nificant. Coke should have anticipated the hypothetical scenario of Vernon
and dealt with it. Alternatively, he should have realized the significance of
the condition and discussed it instead of discounting its importance, relying
on the notion that Mary Vernon had other options open to her. If he had
pursued such courses, he might not have concluded with an unsatisfactory
explanation of the conditionality in the Vernon case. It seems that Coke used
the Vernon case simply as a vehicle for his definition of jointure.
The re-evaluation of Vernon suggests that Coke's six element formula for
jointure is incomplete; his formula was not "perfect". He should have
constructed a seventh requisite on the conditionality issue. It can be argued
that, since the proposed Vernon scenario never occurred, it does not matter
that Coke failed to address the situation. Moreover, one could argue that
Coke would have been foolish to establish a requisite without the backing of a
precedent ruling. Coke established his third requisite, though, without citing
a precedent case. In addition, Coke envisioned several scenarios within his
Vernon analysis to fully define jointure.
Perhaps Coke avoided the conditionality issue in his final analysis specific-
ally because he faced precedent. At first, this statement sounds odd. Why
would Coke avoid an issue which good Common Law precedent resolved?
Because Vernon was not good law! Mary Vernon's jointure was invalid not
because the condition was unreasonable but because it prevented immediate
settlement ofjointure. For Coke to construct a requisite on conditionality, he
would have been forced to analyze the Vernon condition in detail and reveal
that the Court had made a mistake. Mary Vernon should have received her
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dower as well as the benevolence bestowed upon her by her compliance with
the conditions of her husband's will.
Despite this single flaw in Coke's First Institute, his analysis of jointure
formulation is a marvel of illumination. His language is simple and concise,
his explanation clear. Dyer wrote onjointure several times but never mastered
the topic as Coke did. Perhaps Dyer was too early in time, when legal
precedent was not sufficiently established to inspire a complete review like
Coke's Vernon report. Coke published his report on that case almost 25 years
after the Court heard it.
This study of jointure formulation exposes several truths: first, that a
jointure formula evolved quite slowly after the Statute of Uses. While the
development advanced, it was often "sidetracked" with "dead end"
decisions like W4orwood. Secondly, Common Law judges contributed
relatively little in defining a broad image of jointure. They evaded the
important issue of formulation and offered only symptomatic cures for the
plaguing problem of formulation obscurity. Finally, Sir Edward Coke
provided a valuable, if slightly incomplete, model for the "perfect" jointure.
What this study cannot conclusively determine is the intention of the
relevant parts of the Statute of Uses. Without any documented legislative
history, it is difficult to evaluate whether the point was: a) to protect the
widow's inheritance rights while preventing her from impoverishing the heir
by taking both jointure and dower or, b) to limit her rights as convenient for
the father-in-law, husband and son. The latter explanation seems improbable
since the law required that a woman or her father (presumably concerned
with her future welfare) accept and sign any jointure agreement. Thus, a
father-in-law or husband could not exert undue control or ignore a woman's
property rights.
Evaluating the Statute at face value, one notes that Section Six specifically
prevents the impoverishment of heirs by disallowing claims for bothjointure
and dower. The Court, at least in each of the cases discussed above, gives the
mandate great weight and invalidated every claim for both jointure and
dower. Thus, the most reasonable conclusion is that the legislators intended
to promote women's property rights by recognizing the validity of jointure
agreements and to protect heirs by disallowing double satisfaction.
Finally, like any historical investigation, this study raises as many
questions as it answers. First, was the development of jointure formulation
an unusually slow process under Common Law-or did Common Law
respond as slowly to other important legal questions? Secondly, what does
this study indicate about Coke's work in general? Coke produced an invalu-
able analysis of a particular Common Law development but was he complete
in his descriptions and evaluation? One who finds reasoning flaws in the first
section of Coke's work is left to wonder about the reliability of the balance of
Coke's work. Finally, inherent is a social history question, whether women
truly benefited from jointures during the development period. Or did they
face just as many battles in securing their financial requirements as they
would have with dower? Did less generous landowners manipulate the
ambiguities of jointure formulation to deprive women rather than provide
for them? For widows, did the nightmare continue?
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'Sir Edward Coke's discussion of jointure has faced little critical review in the last three
hundred years for several possible reasons. First, Coke's reputation as an authority on English
law and its historical development perhaps intimidates critics who might examine his work. T. F.
T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956), p. 2 8 3 .
Moreover, many historians, when examining marriage and related arrangements, begin not
with the Statute of Uses which recognized jointures but with the Hardwicke Marriage Act of
1753 since that statute clearly defined the steps necessarily taken to enter into the institution of
marriage. 26 Geo. II, c. 33. Third, few marriage settlements orjointure agreements survive from
before the beginning of the seventeenth-century, making research difficult. Finally, historians
have focused on this period and on the Statute of Uses with an interest in property law and
primogeniture. Lloyd Bonfield, Marriage Settlements 1601-1740 (London: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1983), p. 8. Influenced by the advancements made by the women's movement in the last
twenty years, modern scholars have become interested in the legal position of and provisions for
women in early modern England.
2 Henry C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 753, 442.
'Baron and Feme: A Treatise of Law and Equity Concerning Husbands and Wives, 3rd rev. ed.
(London: T. Waller, 1738), p. 101.
4 Black, p. 1382.
5Francis Bacon, The Reading Upon the Statute of Uses 1642; reprint ed. (London: W. Stratford,
1840), p. 169.
6J. Johnson, ed., The Laws Respecting Women (777; reprint ed. (London: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1974), p. 201.
7Bonfield, p. 2.
'Baron and Feme, p. 121.
9To complicate matters further, each court viewed a woman's ability to contract or enter into
marriage settlements differently. Traditionally at law, a married woman or" feme covert" could
not contract. Law courts regarded husband and wife as a single entity which could not contract
with itself. Therefore, if a woman agreed to ajointure settlement after her marriage, a law court
might refuse to bar her dower, using the collateral satisfaction justification and/or using the
justification that the jointure failed since the woman could not contract.
Premarital jointures brought into law courts created havoc since single women could contract.
Even if the single woman had not signed the settlement, the bride's parents' consent acted to bind
the bride. Note, though, that until the Statute of Uses, law courts did not recognize jointures as
official legal instruments. These factors, combined, made it very difficult for parties to anticipate
the outcome of settlement suits brought in law courts. Bonfield, p. 5.
In contrast, equity courts allowed women more bargaining freedom. Ajointress was a party to
a contract and her consent to marry served as consideration in exchange for the jointure
settlement. William Cruise, Digest of the Law of England, Vol. 1 (London: Butterworth, 1818),
p. 231. The fact that a woman failed to secure a settlement before marriage did not necessarily
matter in equity. She could still recoverjointure lands settled after marriage, instead of dower. It
is doubtful that an heir could force ajointure of less than one-third of any estate upon a widow by
suing in equity. The equity courts defended the financial security of widows. Using the equity
route, though, a widow might disclaim dower for a more generous jointure settlement. Maria
Cioni, Women and Land in Elizabethan England With Particular Reference to the Court of Chancery
(London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985), pp. 198, 219.
The differing approaches of the courts of law and equity created a great deal of confusion and
probably led to forum shopping. To prove such a theory, however, one would have to investigate
thoroughly pre-1536 settlement disputes.
't Sydney S. Bell, The Law of Property as A risingfom the Relations of Husband and Wife (Philadelphia:
J. Johnson, 1850), p. 2 18 .
"Danby Pickering, ed., Statutes at Large, Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Benthan, 1763), p. 360.
12 Baron and Feme, p. 151.
3 Pickering, p. 362. The information on jointures made after marriage, contained in this
paragraph, came from section nine of the Statute of Uses.
"4 Pickering, p. 363.
" Strictly speaking, landowners could not devise property by will until 1540. K. B. Mc Farlane,
The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 63. They avoided
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primogeniture, however, by employing uses. They enfeoffed their property to another, took
back a use in that property and devised the use as they pleased. Moreover, landowners directed
in their wills how feoffees should devise their interests in the property. Through uses, landowners
managed to devise property and, thus, provide for their younger children.
The Statute of Uses transformed uses into legal interests which were no longer devisible.
Naturally, landowners reacted violently to this aspect of the 1536 legislation. The hostility found
expression along with other grievances in a rebellion known as the Pilgrimage of Grace. The
Statute of Wills of 1540 signified Henry VIII's willingness to compromise. This statute allowed
landowners to devise two-thirds of the land they held in feudal tenure. J. M. W. Bean, The Decline
of English Feudalism, 1215-1540 (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1968), p. 258.
When the Statute of Uses confirmed testamentary dispositions predating I May 1536, it
referred to dispositions concerning land held in use.
6Johnson, p. 202. A felony conviction for the husband did not result in a forfeiture. See
Note 18.
"The early modern practice of reporting case decisions differs dramatically from the modern
system. Today judges write opinions immediately after rendering decisions. Each opinion
includes a brief description of the facts, relevant information concerning the parties involved,
legal analysis of those facts, and the judge's decision.
Little first hand information exists for sixteenth-century trials. The "Reports" which remain
arejudges' reviews of important cases which they heard. Often judges wrote years after hearing
the cases. Therefore, in reporting cases, judges regularly omitted significant information such as
key facts of the case, the parties names and even the decision rendered. The purpose of a report
was to clarify or highlight a new point of law or line of reasoning. As a result, details of the
particular cases were lost. Such a reporting system creates major problems for historical review
as will become apparent below.
" Statutes of the Realm 1810; reprint ed., Vol. IV, pt. 1 (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1963),
p. 21.
9James Dyer, Reports; reprint ed., Vol. I (London: Butterworth, 1974), p. 976.
2 Pickering, p. 362.
2 Dyer, I: 976.
"Dyer, I: 616.
"Anonymous Case, 6 E.6 B Dower 69 (1552).
2 Robert Brooke, Brooke's New Cases (London: Best and Place, 1578), p. 69.
"Dyer, I: 616.
2 Dyer, II: 1466.
"Statutes, II: 583. Where abbreviated, words in quoted text have been expanded.
2 Dyer, II: 1466.
29Dyer, II: 228a.
3 Statutes, II: 583.
" Dyer, II: 2476. Black defines fee tail as "A freehold estate in which there is a fixed line of
inheritable succession limited to the issue of the body of the grantee or devisee." Black, p. 554.
"Sir Edward Coke was born in 1552 and attended Trinity College, Cambridge, where he
became the High Steward of the University. He studied law at the Inner Temple, was called to
the bar in 1578 and became Speaker of the House of Commons fifteen years later. During the
early years of his career, Coke, inspired by Queen Elizabeth, served as a great supporter of royal
prerogative. In 1594, Coke championed Elizabeth's causes as Attorney General.
Coke's political views change after 1606, though. As Chief Justice of Common Pleas, Coke
campaigned against royal prerogative and worked to uphold the supreme authority of the
Common Law. In 1613 Coke, transferred o another court, served as Chief Justice of Kings
Bench. There he continued to make political trouble for KingJames I and was dismissed in 1616.
Coke's career did not end there, however. In 1621, he acted as leader of the parliamentary
opposition but was jailed in the Tower in 1622 with his papers confiscated. He returned to
parliament in 1628 but died in 1634. Heralded as a preeminent legal scholar, Coke is most well
known for his Reports, published in 1600, and his First Institute of 1628. Plucknett, pp. 242-245.
" Dyer, III: 317a. And Edward Coke, Reports, 1658; reprint ed., pt. IV (London: T.
Whieldon, 1977), p. 1.
' Coke, Reports, IV: 2.
"Coke, Reports, IV: 3a.
'Coke, Reports, IV: 3a.
"Coke, Reports, IV: 36.
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"Dyer, III: 317b.
39Coke, Reports, IV: 4a.
'Coke, Reports, IV: 4b.
"Dyer, III' 317b.
"Dyer, III: 317b.
"John Bright, A Treatise on the Law of Husband and Wife as Respects Property (London: William
Benning and Co., 1849), p. 440.
'Bell, p. 223.
"Edmund Atherley, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Marriage and Other Family Settlements
(Philadelphia: John Littell, 1840), p. 263.
'Atherley, p. 263.
"Coke, Reports, IV: 36.
"Coke, Reports, IV: 3a. Translation into English Black, pp. 1115, 1127.
"John Brograve, "Jointures," in Three Learned Readings Made Upon Three Very Usefull Statutes
(London: W. Lee, 1648), p. 82.
'Brograve, p. 82.
"' Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institute of the Laws of England, 1628; reprint ed. (London:
Butterworth, 1832), p. xxxvii.
52Coke, First Institute, p. 476.
53Coke, First Institute, p. 477.
'Coke, First Institute, p. 478.
55,,i. L." and "T. E.," eds., Woman's Lawyer (London: John More, 1632), p. 196.
Woman s Lawyer, p. first preface.
57 Woman's Lawyer, p. second preface.
" "A condition precedent is one which must happen or be performed before the estate to which
it is annexed can rest or be enlarged; or it is one which is to be performed before some right
dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed." Black, p. 266.
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